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Abstract. Financial and non-financial disclosure play a central role in the functioning of capital 
markets. In this context, the Internet has been adopted as an effective mechanism for large 
companies to disseminate corporate information. The institutional theory approach has been applied 
to identify both formal (fundamentally legal and economic) and informal factors that significantly 
influence listed companies’ level of corporate transparency on the Internet. Our work aims to build 
on existing study by focusing on two main objectives. Firstly, to make a comparative study of the 
corporate transparency of listed companies from Mexico and Spain by creating an index of 
corporate transparency on the Internet (e-CTI). And secondly, to identify the factors that affect this 
index using multiple regression analysis. Our study population is comprised of 70 companies, of 
which 35 belong to the Mexican Price and Quotations Index (IPyC) and 35 to the Spanish IBEX 35 
index. The descriptive analysis reveals significant differences in the level of information disclosure 
between the two countries. The companies listed in Mexico obtain an e-CTI of 59%, while the 
Spanish ones register 80%, i.e. more importance is assigned to the disclosure of corporate 
governance data in Spain than in Mexico. Furthermore, this analysis shows that the factors most 
telling with regards to corporate transparency are the strength and application of law, GDP per 
capita, inflation and firm-level variables such as ownership concentration and Chairman of the 
Board-Chief Executive Officer (COB-CEO) duality. However, other variables such as board size 
and composition, profitability, leverage and firm size are not significant for the purposes of this 
analysis. Our work is of great relevance today, since most studies have focused on developed 
countries, mainly in the U.S. and Europe, with few comparisons being made between developed and 
developing countries, such as Spain and Mexico.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate transparency has become an important dimension of corporate 
governance and has a positive impact on the market evaluation of businesses 
(Mercer, 2004; Hodge et al., 2006). More transparency helps investors understand 
management decisions, reduces information asymmetry, enhances confidence in 
the capital market and increases foreign direct investment (Bushman and Smith, 
2001).  
Corporate transparency has been adopted as one of the guiding principles of 







(Choi et al., 2004). For the OECD, corporate governance is a key 
element to increasing economic efficiency and growth. Among its principles of 
good governance, disclosure and transparency are viewed as “ensuring timely and 
accurate disclosure on all material matters regarding the corporation, including 
financial situation, performance, ownership and corporate governance of the 
company” (OECD, 2004).  
In recent years there has been increased public interest in corporate 
transparency, reflected in the issuance of new regulations in various countries. In 
1991, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) established 
the Special Committee on Financial Disclosure, in order to systematise the 
corporate information provided to stakeholders (AICPA, 1994). In 2002, the 
IFAC issued a document to ensure the consistency and comparability of 
information disclosed on the Internet, considering the type and format of 
information, the security and integrity of data, contacts and the use of different 
languages. In Spain, the Transparency Law was passed and a unified code of 
corporate transparency established in 2003, these being viewed as essential 
elements of good governance. In Mexico, the principles of transparency have been 
addressed in the Stock Market Law and the Regulation for Issuers of 2006, taking 
into account OECD principles.  
An important body of research has focused on describing and comparing the 
information disseminated by corporate companies on the web. This work can be 
                                               
1
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
2
 International Federation of Accountants 
3
 International Finance Corporation 
  
Briano & Rodríguez                                         Corporate Information on the Internet by Listed Companies      3 
divided into two main categories. The first includes descriptive works, giving an 
overview of the current state of corporate disclosure on the Internet. Such studies 
focus on one country or compare different regions. The second category of studies 
identifies the variables that affect corporate transparency, using different 
statistical tools (Marston and Polei, 2004).  
One factor that has been widely linked to corporate transparency is the legal 
system (La Porta et al., 1998; Jaggi and Low, 2000). Bushman et al. (2004) 
showed that corporate transparency is related to the legal/judicial environment in 
each country, and that financial transparency is related to economic policy. In this 
sense, there is greater demand for corporate transparency in countries with weaker 
legal protection (Bhat, Hope, and Kang, 2006; Miller, 2004; Leuz et al., 2003). 
Thus, differences in the legal system, the development of mechanisms and 
corporate governance structures and their efficiency, depend on the nature of the 
institutions in each country (Berglöf and Pajuste, 2005; Becht et al., 2003).  
In the present study we adopt the institutional theory approach, which has been 
used as a theoretical basis in a number of different contexts. This is considered the 
most consistent conceptual framework and one that is appropriate to study the 
influence of environmental factors on business function (Veciana, 1999). Recent 
studies have considered how and why a country’s legal system affects its 
institutional framework and how this in turn affects its financial performance. 
Institutional theory considers firms to be economic units operating within contexts 
shaped by institutions that affect their behaviour and the expectations imposed on 
them (Campbell et al., 1991; Roe, 1991, 1994; Campbell, 2007). Assuming this 
relationship, it can be accepted that companies operating in countries with 
institutional similarities will adopt homogeneous forms of behaviour (La Porta et 
al., 1998; Claessens and Fan, 2002). In this vein, Campbell (2006) argued that the 
companies most likely to act responsibly and to report on their behaviour are 
those operating in environments with a strong institutional and regulatory coercive 
pressure, and with an extensive, well-developed legal system oriented towards 
stakeholder protection.  
The present study builds on previous work, analysing the information disclosed 
on the Internet by listed companies in Mexico and Spain in order to evaluate and 
compare their respective levels of corporate transparency via an index composed 
of 43 items. Moreover, we identify the relationship between the disclosure level 
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and the formal institutional factors (including corporate ones) that characterise the 
study population. Thus, we consider a hitherto unexplored area in the case of 
Mexico, and obtain comparable results in both countries. We believe the results 
obtained will be useful to the agencies responsible for issuing regulations and 
codes of good governance in these respective countries. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the first section reviews the 
literature on institutional factors that affect corporate transparency on the Internet, 
and goes on to describe the involvement of the institutions and regulations of each 
country in this process. The second describes the methodology used to build the 
Corporate Transparency Index applied to the companies in our population. The 
third section develops and establishes the research hypotheses. This is followed by 
a description of the research design, including a selection of the population and 
data collection. This section also describes the variables and the proposed model. 
The fifth section discusses the results of the statistical analysis. The last section 
presents the conclusions drawn, together with the implications arising from the 
study, its limitations and possible future lines of research.  
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Recent financial scandals, occurring mainly in the U.S. and Europe, have 
seriously undermined confidence in the transparency of information markets, 
increasing pressures and provoking stakeholders to demand greater corporate 
transparency. As a consequence, international institutions have become more 
involved in the issuance of regulations and codes of good governance, with a view 
to restoring the confidence of investors in large corporations. In this respect, 
Mercer (2004) and Hodge et al. (2006) have stated that the credibility of 
information is an essential element in the governance of a society.  
According to Debreceny et al. (2002), there are three reasons for management 
to disclose information voluntarily: 1) to reduce agency or contracting costs 
(Watts, 1977); 2) to send signals to the stock market, which may increase the 
value of the shares (Botosan, 1997; Frankel et al., 1999); and 3) to provide 
information in addition to mandatory requirements, thus reducing capital costs 
(Yeo and Ziebart, 1995). Cormier et al. (2005) identified three factors that 
influence the quality of corporate disclosure: 1) what other companies in the same 
industry or country are doing in this respect (imitation); 2) what companies have 
done in the past (routine); and 3) regulations and laws governing information 
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disclosure (institutions). Thus, corporate transparency will vary with each 
country's legal system, with demand for information disclosure being greater in 
countries with a weak legal system (Bushman et al., 2004; Leuz et al., 2003).  
The use of the Internet as a medium of interactive communication between the 
company and its stakeholders has acquired great importance in recent years. The 
Internet enables companies to disclose corporate information globally without 
time limitations, and to reduce printing and staff costs (Lymer and Debreceny, 
2003; Gandía, 2008). On the other hand, the Internet creates the same 
opportunities to access information to creditors, stockholders, analysts and 
investors (Ching Lai et al., 2010). Among the studies developed within a national 
context, we highlight those made in Spain (Gandía, 2008; Wallace et al., 1994), 
Kenya (Barako et al., 2006), Germany (Marston and Polei, 2004; Lattemann, 
2005), New Zealand (Oyelere et al., 2003), the U.K. (Craven and Marston, 1999), 
the U.S.A. (Ettredge et al., 2002), Hong Kong (Wallace and Naser, 1995), 
Malaysia (Hamid, 2005), China (Xiao et al., 2004) and Mexico (Chow and Wong 
Boren, 1987). Comparative studies between countries have also been carried out 
(Simnett et al., 2009; Bonsón and Escobar, 2002, 2004, 2006; Van der Laan Smith 
et al., 2005; Hope, 2003; Archambault and Archambault, 2003; Debreceny et al., 
2002; Gandía, 2003; Geerings et al., 2003; Debreceny and Rahman, 2005; Bollen 
et al., 2006). These studies show that companies use the Internet to disseminate 
information related to three criteria: 1) financial and corporate information; 2) 
relations with investors; and 3) information on corporate governance (Gandía, 
2008).  
The growing public interest in corporate transparency is reflected in new 
regulations issued by different international organisations. In 2004, the OECD 
issued its principles of good governance, among which are those of disclosure and 
transparency. The IFAC has stated that quality in financial reporting is crucial to 
capital markets and sustainable economic development. In 2010, as a result of a 
survey of 25 leaders in the field worldwide, IFAC published five 
recommendations for enterprise reporting: 1) that the primary responsibility of 
managers should be performance, not compliance; 2) that the focus should be 
shifted from the shareholder to the stakeholder; 3) that performance indicators 
should be published, taking into account economic, social and environmental 
factors; 4) that the dimensions of good governance and sustainability should be 
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integrated into the firm’s strategy and its operations and communication with 
stakeholders; 5) that communication with stakeholders should be improved. 
According to IFAC, the main causes of the current financial crisis are failures of 
corporate governance in the supply of financial information, together with short-
term vision and poor risk management (IFAC, 2010). For IFAC, transparency, 
accountability and cooperation by management add value to the firm. In 1991, the 
AICPA established an ad hoc financial disclosure procedure, aimed at 
systematising business information and identifying the basic elements to be 
reported to stakeholders (AICPA, 1994). Subsequently, AICPA issued 
recommendations to improve corporate transparency which cover four main areas: 
1) business environment; 2) strategy; 3) resources and processes; and 4) the 
performance of the firm (AICPA, 2010). 
A U.S. law that has had significant impact in many countries and includes rules 
relating to the importance of technology (especially the Internet and corporate 
governance), is the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (section 409), which obliges 
companies to report real-time information that significantly affects their financial 
and economic position. In addition, section 403 of the Act requires the Internet be 
used to report transactions between managers and equity shareholders in the 
company, and to communicate major reports (Forms 10-Q, 10-K and 8-K) for 
stakeholders. The European Commission's main objective in this field is to 
standardise reporting requirements, viewing the Internet as a means of 
dissemination of financial information within EU Member States (Gallego et al., 
2009). The Centre for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) 
identified five important aspects of corporate transparency: 1) the intensity of 
financial disclosures; 2) the intensity of disclosures on corporate governance; 3) 
the accounting principles used to measure financial disclosures; 4) the timeliness 
of financial information; and 5) the quality of auditing in financial reporting. 
Guidelines and regulations in Latin America refer to the following principles of 
good governance and minimum requirements of disclosure issued by the OECD: 
1) the financial and operating results of the company; 2) the company’s 
objectives; 3) the ownership of large blocks of shares and voting rights; 4) the 
remuneration policy applied to board members and executives, and other 
information related to these persons; 5) transactions between related parties; 6) 
risk factors; 7) information related to employees and other stakeholders; and 8) 
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structures and corporate governance policies (OECD, 2004). Moreover, the 
Andean Development Corporation (CAF) has published an Andean Corporate 
Governance Code. In the case of Spain, we find the Transparency Law of 2003, 
and in Mexico some guidelines issued by the stock market regarding the 
periodicity and content of the information disclosed. 
According to Choi and Levich (1990) and Adhikari and Tondkar (1992), the 
reporting of a higher or lower level of information by firms depends on the 
business environment in each country. Various factors have been identified, 
including the economy, capital markets, accounting practices and the regulatory 
framework, enforcement mechanisms and national culture (Wallace and Gernon, 
1991; Cooke and Wallace, 1990). La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000) argued that 
the legal environment differs among countries, in part due to their varying legal 
backgrounds and traditions. 
2.1. Hypotheses and description of variables  
2.1.1. Legal environment 
According to Jaggi and Low (2000), the politico-social and economic dimensions 
of a country influence the prevailing level of corporate transparency. The 
institutions in a society, such as the legal system, family groups, social groups and 
the education system, are the result of its political and social environment. 
Bushman et al. (2004) explored the relationship between corporate transparency 
and three aspects of the legal/ judicial regime: legal origin, the efficiency of the 
judicial system and the degree of patent protection. Durnev and Han Kim (2005) 
showed that corporate governance practices and disclosure vary widely among 
countries, in direct proportion to the strength of legal protection afforded to 
investors. Furthermore, the legal and economic environment of a country is a key 
factor in corporate disclosure. 
Following La Porta et al. (1998, 2002, 2006), various indices have been 
proposed to measure the strength of legal protection for investors and creditors. 
According to Leuz et al. (2003), the application of the law can be measured 
against three variables: 1) the efficiency of the judicial system; 2) the 
implementation of the rule of law; and 3) the index of corruption. Djankov et al. 
(2008) proposed measuring the protection of minority shareholders against 
expropriation by corporate shareholders by employing an index of protection that 
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focuses on private enforcement mechanisms such as disclosure, litigation or the 
approval/rejection of certain corporate transactions. Taking all the above into 
consideration, we chose to apply the World Bank’s Worldwide Government 
Indicator (WGI) to measure the degree of enforcement in each of the countries 
studied. This indicator reflects the traditions and institutions by which authority in 
a country is applied, including the process through which the government is 
selected. It monitors the government’s ability to effectively formulate and 
implement policies, and the interaction between economic and social institutions. 
The index includes six dimensions of governance for 213 economies, spanning the 
period 1996-2010: 1) voice and accountability; 2) political stability and the 
absence of violence; 3) government effectiveness; 4) regulatory quality; 5) the 
state of law; and 6) control of corruption (World Bank, 2010). According to 
Kaufmann et al. (2011), the WGI enables informative comparisons to be made 
between countries over time. Under this scenario, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between a country’s WGI and the e-CTI of 
listed companies. 
2.1.2. Economic development 
The economic system affects how companies interact with each other and with 
their stakeholders, as well as the information needs of different users 
(Archambault and Archambault, 2003). Berry (1987) and Nobes (1983) classified 
countries into two groups: those with a macroeconomic orientation and those 
which focus on microeconomic issues. The first is subordinate to national 
economic policy, while the second focuses on the companies and is independent 
of government. Doupnik and Salter (1993) reported that countries with a 
microeconomic approach have higher disclosure levels than those which take a 
macroeconomic view. On the other hand, in a more highly developed economy, 
firms require more funding, which increases the need for transparency. Thus 
Salter (1998) argued that levels of information disclosure are higher in developed 
countries than in developing ones. Hope et al. (2008) selected GDP per capita as 
representative of the level of economic development in a country. 
H2: The higher the level of economic development in a country (GDP per capita), 
the greater the number of e-CTI listed companies. 
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2.1.3. Inflation  
Inflation is a key factor in the economic environment and thus has a major impact 
on accounting practices (Meek and Saudagaran, 1990). High inflation can 
historically produce severe distortions in financial statements, and so companies 
operating in countries with high inflation rates are more likely to use price level 
accounting, thus increasing the volume of information made available to investors 
(Archambault and Archambault, 1999). Doupnik and Salter (1993) reported a 
positive association between inflation and the disclosure of information in 
countries with a macroeconomic orientation. 
H3: The higher the rate of inflation in the country where the company is listed, 
the higher the e-CTI of listed companies. 
2.1.4 Size of the board 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) suggested that the board is a control and 
monitoring mechanism whose role is to evaluate the performance of management 
and ensure performance, to the benefit of shareholders. Although there is no 
consensus as to what constitutes good advice, Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) 
considered both the independence of the board and the presence of a non-
executive chairman to be relevant factors, and contended that board size does 
indeed influence the company’s level of information disclosure. According to Cai 
et al. (2006), small boards have gained popularity because larger ones are 
associated with higher costs and greater bureaucracy, thus reducing corporate 
transparency. According to Gandía (2008), the board should be comprised of a 
reasonable number of directors, to ensure proper functioning and supervisory 
capacity. The concentration of board positions can lead to a lack of transparency, 
while large boards may harm the company, hindering the decision-making and 
communication processes (Jensen, 1993). Studies by Gandía (2008), Kent and 
Steward (2008) and Willekens et al. (2005), have reported a positive relation 
between board size and corporate disclosure, while Barako et al. (2006) found a 
negative relation. The size of the board can positively affect the level of 
transparency provided on the Internet, providing a positive impression of the 
company (Raheja, 2005). In the following hypothesis, we predict a positive 
relationship between these variables.  
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H4: There is a positive relationship between the size of the board and corporate 
information disclosure by listed companies.   
2.1.5. Independence of the board 
The board is usually composed of both internal and external members. The former 
are generally selected from the family group or from company managers. External 
directors belong to the board, but have no other financial or personal relationship 
with the management of the company; thus, there are no relationships or 
circumstances that might affect the exercise of their independence (Rouf, 2011; 
Cai et al., 2006). Beasley (1996) found that the presence of independent directors 
reduces the likelihood of financial fraud, and Barako et al. (2006) and Chen and 
Jaggi (2000), argued that independent directors constitute a governance 
mechanism which strengthens the board's capacity to demonstrate transparency to 
the market. The presence of independent members on the board provides a means 
of monitoring the effectiveness of this improvement (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Eng and Mak, 2003, among others). The impact of board independence on the 
disclosure of corporate information is not conclusive. On the one hand, some 
consider independent directors to be more effective than non-independent 
members with respect to maximising shareholder value. On the other hand, non-
independent members of the board may contribute increased knowledge and 
experience (Rouf, 2011). In a study carried out in Singapore, Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006) provided evidence that a board with a high proportion of 
independent directors is positively and significantly associated with high 
corporate transparency levels. Other studies have observed a significant 
relationship between the level of disclosure and the proportion of independent 
directors (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Leung and Horwitz, 
2004; Ajinkya, and Sengupta, 2005; Kent and Steward, 2008). On the other hand, 
Eng and Mak (2003) found a negative relationship in this respect. The hypothesis 
we propose is as follows: 
H5: The higher the proportion of independent directors, the higher the e-CTI in 
listed companies. 
2.1.6.  Ownership concentration 
Under the agency theory approach, the ownership structure is one of the main 
mechanisms for mitigating expropriation by the management (Shleifer and 
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Vishny, 1997). An important factor in shaping the corporate governance system is 
the type of ownership structure; thus, the degree of ownership concentration 
determines the distribution of power and corporate control (Aoki, 1995). 
According to McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993), when the ownership structure is 
diffuse, there is a need for stronger monitoring (and consequently a higher level of 
disclosure) in order to maintain equity of access for minority shareholders. The 
impact of ownership structure on the practice of corporate disclosure has been 
widely studied. Chau and Gray (2002) found a negative relationship between 
family ownership concentration and the level of disclosure, which is in line with 
the results obtained by Ho and Wong (2001), Hossain et al. (1994), Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002), Barako et al. (2006), Vander Bauwhede and Willekens (2008), 
Gandía (2008), Makhija and Patton (2004), among others. In companies with 
large shareholders or a high concentration of ownership, information transparency 
tends to be reduced, since the information can be transferred directly through 
informal channels, or simply because there is a greater alignment of interests, 
which reduces the need for better governance in respect of minority shareholders. 
Taking these considerations into account, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H6: There is a negative association between ownership concentration and the e-
CTI in listed companies. 
2.1.7. COB-CEO duality 
COB-CEO duality exists when a single person holds both positions in a company. 
From the agency theory point of view, the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
board may be compromised in such a situation (Blackburn, 1994). This 
concentration of power may damage the company's corporate transparency and 
lead to the generation of poor-quality information (Simon and Wong, 2001; 
Forker, 1992). Gandía (2008) believes COB-CEO duality to be detrimental to a 
company, and that the separation of these positions tends to increase the 
effectiveness of the board, promoting a greater willingness by the COB to advise 
the CEO and enhancing independence between the board and corporate 
governance (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Rechner 
and Dalton, 1991). Therefore, the hypothesis proposed is as follows: 
H7: There is a negative relationship between COB-CEO duality and the e-CTI for 
listed companies. 
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2.1.8. Firms’ characteristics 
Studies suggest that several variables affect the corporate transparency level of 
listed companies. Although the results obtained are not conclusive, the main 
factors identified in this respect are leverage, size, industry and profitability 
(ROA). 
Leverage (Lev). According to Watts and Zimmerman (1986), the leverage of a 
company corresponds to the agency costs between the company and its debt 
holders. Studies have suggested that companies with higher debt are usually under 
closer scrutiny by creditors, and that such companies, therefore, disclose more 
about their management (Jaggi and Low, 2000; Oyelere et al., 2003). There is 
expected to be a positive relationship between debt (long-term debt/total assets) 
and corporate e-CTI for listed companies in Latin America (Willekens, 2005). 
Company size (Size). Several studies have found that company size has a 
significant influence on the dissemination of information (Chow and Wong-
Boren, 1987; Craven and Marston, 1999; Barako et al., 2006; Bonsón and 
Escobar, 2002, 2004, 2006; Cormier et al., 2005). Larger firms are believed to be 
more motivated to disclose information, as they have a greater number of 
shareholders and stakeholders who demand extensive, detailed information (Jaggi 
and Low, 2000). This variable is often measured as the natural logarithm of total 
assets or number of employees (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993; Wallace and Naser, 1995). There is expected to be a positive 
relationship between company size and e-CTI. 
Industry (Ind). Industry type, one of the variables associated with the level of 
information disclosure, is defined as the main economic activity from which 
income is derived (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Wallace and Naser (1995) argued that 
disclosure levels vary according to the industry in which the company is active. 
Recent empirical studies have associated industry type and corporate 
transparency, but the results obtained to date are inconclusive. Among those who 
have found a significant relationship are Gandía (2008), Roberts and Gray (1988), 
Wagenhoffer (1990), Cooke (1991), Bonsón and Escobar (2002, 2004, 2006), 
Ettredge et al. (2001), Oyelere et al. (2003), Gul and Leung (2004), Botosan 
(1997) and Nagar et al. (2003). However other studies, such as those by Wallace 
et al. (1994), Larrán and Giner (2002), Craven and Marston (1999) and Owusu-
Ansah (1998), have found no significant relationship between the industry and the 
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amount of information disclosed. Taking these findings into account, we 
hypothesise a positive relationship between industry and corporate disclosure on 
the Internet. 
Return on assets (ROA). Previous studies have shown that profitability affects the 
level of corporate transparency (Wallace and Naser, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; 
Owusu-Ansah, 1998). According to Inchausti (1997), the most profitable 
companies make greater use of information disclosure to gain a competitive 
advantage, while firms publishing less information tend to be underperformers. 
Although there is no consensus on the direction of the relationship between ROA 
and the dissemination of information, some studies have found that the most 
profitable companies disclose more information (Dye, 1985; Verrecchia, 1990; 
Darrough and Stoughton, 1990). On the other hand, for Lang and Lundholm 
(1993) and Wallace et al. (1994), the evidence remains insufficient and unclear. 
We hypothesise that there is a positive correlation between a company’s e-CTI 
and its profitability. 
3. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1. Corporate Transparency Index 
According to Ortiz and Clavel (2006) and Marston and Shrives (1991), the 
development of indices is one of the basic techniques used to study the 
information provided by companies, and one of the principal means of evaluating 
corporate transparency in a particular industry. Most empirical studies have 
focused on the study and content analysis of annual company reports (Mir et al., 
2009) - one of the most important channels by which corporate information is 
disseminated (Hossain et al., 1995; Meek et al., 1995; Botosan, 1997; Depoers, 
2000). Other studies have focused on the information displayed on company 
websites (Che Haat et al., 2008; Garay and Gonzalez, 2008; Gandía, 2008; 
Bonsón and Escobar, 2006; Hamid, 2005; Xiao et al., 2004; Qu and Leung, 2006; 
Vander Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008: Ching Lai et al., 2010, among others. 
The methodology generally used in these studies is based on the content analysis 
of web sites through the presence or absence of a set of items, assigning values of 
1 or 0 depending on whether or not this information is disclosed. Some studies 
have taken as their point of reference the indices published by international 
companies such as S&P, AIMR or CIFAR. Bonsón and Escobar (2006) 
constructed an index of 44 items that should be present in company web sites.  
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Four main criteria are generally considered when building an index of corporate 
ransparency: 1) weighting criteria; 2) the source of information; 3) the selection of 
information items; and 4) the selection of the explanatory variables (Bonsón and 
Escobar, 2004; Garcia and Sanchez, 2006; Ortiz and Clavel, 2006; Marston and 
Shrives, 1991). The methodology generally used in these studies is based on 
analysing the content of corporate web sites. This type of non-weighted index 
with dichotomous variables (taking the value 1 or 0) has previously been used in 
studies related to the evaluation of corporate information provided on the Internet 
(Gallego et al., 2009; Hamid, 2005; Xiao et al., 2004; Gomez et al., 2005; Bonsón 
and Escobar, 2006; Gandía, 2008; Barako et al., 2006; Qu and Leung, 2006; 
Petersen and Planborg, 2006), on issues such as financial reporting, corporate 
governance and social responsibility, intangibles and strategic information.  
We propose a disclosure index of 41 items compiled from company web sites. 
To calculate the index, each element is defined as a dummy variable that can take 
the value 1 or 0, depending on whether or not the company provides the kind of 
information specified. Three sub-indices are adopted: 1) information about the 
company; 2) financial reporting and investor relations; and 3) information on 
corporate governance. The elements of each sub-index are then aggregated to 
obtain the global index, which is the sum of the scores assigned to each 
information category.  
The first group of elements of corporate information represent 34.1% of all the 
elements in the e-CTI, and contain information on the company’s profile, strategy, 
products and/or services, its international presence, customers, suppliers, quality, 
technology, community and environment, contacts, press room and policies on 
corporate social responsibility. The sub-index of financial information (22% of 
the items) is related to the publication of annual reports, periodic financial 
information, financial highlights, trading in overseas markets, shareholder 
services, corporate presentations, stock information, relevant events and press 
releases. Finally, the corporate governance sub-index represents 43.9% of the e-
CTI elements and focuses on issues related to the company’s code of conduct, the 
standards and policies of corporate governance, compliance with the best practices 
of corporate governance, the annual general meeting, the composition of the 
board, supporting committees, management, the composition of shareholders, the 
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company's bylaws, dividend distribution policies, takeovers and risk factors. Table 
1 below shows a breakdown of the elements that constitute the e-CTI. 
3.2. Calculation methodology 
As a basis for constructing this index, we employed the methodology proposed 
by Gandía and Andrés (2005), taking into account the information contained in 
Table 1. Each item disclosed by the company is assigned a value of 1 or 0. Since 
the contents discussed are grouped into three sections, we first calculated the sub-
indices in each one and then aggregated them to obtain the overall index. The 
indices represent the ratio between the sum of points obtained and the total points 
that the company could have obtained, by disclosing information on all the items. 
Each sub-index is obtained as follows: 
e-CTI
p
 =    Number of disclosed items____                                
Total of obtainable items 




p    






= Global Transparency Index. 
I
p
 = Sub-index value comprising the e-CTI. 
P
t  
= Proportion of the sub-index “i” in the total items of the global index. 
The global index is not obtained as a simple average of the various sub-indices, 
but is a weighted average which represents the relative value of each element. 
According to this methodology, both the sub-indices and the global index may 
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     Source: The authors, based on Barako et al., 2006; Bonsón and Escobar, 2006; 
     Marston and Polei, 2004; Ettredge et al., 2001; Gandía, 2008; Bollen et al., 2006. 
Table 1. Items of Corporate Transparency Index on the Internet 
3.3. Population and data selection        
Information was compiled for the 70 largest companies (by stock price) in Mexico 
and Spain, of which 35 are listed on the IPyC (Mexico) and 35 on the IBEX 35 
(Spain). The indices are designed according to internationally-accepted standards 
and rules, with each company being weighted by its market capitalisation adjusted 
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for free float; thus, the relative weight of each company in the index is 
representative of its actual stock market value (Bolsa de Comercio, 2011). In the 
case of Mexico we selected companies belonging to the Prices and Quotations 
Index (IPyC), which is a reliable indicator of the major stocks listed on the Bolsa 
Mexicana de Valores, representing 70% of the capitalisation market (BMV, 
2010). Companies that belong to the IBEX 35 are characterised by a higher 
market capitalisation and a strong investment presence in Latin America 
(Sánchez, 1999). 
Figure 1 provides a breakdown of the companies, by industry and country, for 
the year 2009. The industry type classification used by the Spanish Stock 
Exchange Authority was taken as the fundamental reference to enable the two 































Source: The authors, based on information  
compiled from Latibex and IBEX 35. 
Figure 1. Breakdown of population by industry (Mexico and Spain)  
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Differences were observed in the distribution of industries between the two 
groups of companies. In Mexico there are two main groups: basic materials, 
manufacturing and construction (34%) and consumer goods (34%), while in Spain 
there are three: basic materials, industry and construction (34%), banking and 
financial services (26%) and oil and energy (20%). 
We used publicly available information on company websites to calculate the e-
CTI and to identify the variables of corporate governance. The financial 
information was obtained from annual company reports. 
3.4. Model development and variable measurement 
To test our hypotheses, the following regression model was estimated. Table 2 
summarises the definitions and the notations of the variables used in the model. 
The dependent variable is e-CTI, and the independent variables are institutional 
factors (legal system, GDP per capita and inflation), corporate governance 
dimensions (board size, COB-CEO duality and ownership concentration).  
 
Table 2. Summary of variables, proxies and notations in the regression model 
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The following control variables were also included: company size, industry 
type, profitability and leverage (Simnett et al., 2009; Vander Bauwhede and 
Willekens, 2008). As the e-CTI takes a continuous value, the model was estimated 
using multiple linear analyses.  
e-TCI = β0 + β1WGIj + β2Devj + β3CPIj + β4 Board_Sizej + β5 Board_Indj+  
β6Ownj + β7Dualj + β8Levj + β9LnSizej + β10ROAj + β11Indj + Uj 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 summarises the descriptive statistics of the variables analysed for the 
year 2009. The mean and median proportion of shares held by controlling 
shareholders (OWN) were 53.8% and 51% respectively for Mexico, and 49.5% 
and 49% respectively for Spain. The mean (median) board size was 14 (13) for 
Mexico and 14 (15) for Spain. The mean (median) values for board independence 
were 45.8% (45.5%) for Mexico and 42.2% (40%) for Spain. The mean (median) 
level of profitability (ROA) was 11.5% (9%) in Mexico and 5% (5%) in Spain. 
The mean (median) level of debt (LEV) was 21.4% (20%) for Mexico and 30.5% 
(34%) for Spain. The strength of the legal system, as measured by the World Bank 
Global Governance Index, was 47% for Mexico and 76% for Spain. In our study, 
COB-CEO duality is a dummy variable assigned the value 1 if the same person 
holds both positions, and 0 otherwise. This duality practice is less common in 
Mexico (57.1%) than in Spain (82.9%). The mean value of the e-CTI was 59.3% 
in Mexico and 80% in Spain. Considering the three sub-indices concerning 
information disclosure, we find that Mexican companies focus on discretionary 
corporate information (68%), particularly in aspects related to the company's 
corporate profile, products and/or services, the presence and coverage of the 
company, its clients and press room. In Spain, on the other hand, more attention is 
paid to corporate governance (70%), particularly with respect to ethics and the 
code of conduct, corporate governance policies, compliance with the code of good 
governance, shareholders, board composition and support committees, company 
bylaws and the composition of the executive team. In Mexico, companies are 
more reluctant to disclose corporate governance information on their websites, 
with this sub-index scoring a mean value of barely 42%. 
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With respect to firm size (Ln: number of employees), we obtained mean 
(median) values of 9.56 (9.90) in Mexico, and 9.67 (9.83) in Spain. GDP per 
capita was $9,243.03 in Mexico and $29,875.09 in Spain. 
 
Average Median Deviation N % N Average Median Deviation N % N 
Ownership concentration 0.54 0.51 0.21 33 100 0.49 0.49 0.23 35 100 
Size of the board 2.57 2.56 0.29 35 100 2.63 2.71 0.25 35 100 
Board composition 0.46 0.46 0.15 34 100 0.42 0.40 0.16 35 100 
ROA 0.11 0.09 0.09 35 100 0.05 0.05 0.07 35 100 
WGI 0.47 0.47 0.00 35 100 0.76 0.76 0.00 35 100 
COB-CEO No duality 42.90 17.10 
Duality 57.10 82.90 
e-CTI 0.59 0.61 0.13 35 100 0.80 0.80 0.07 35 100 
Ln_Size 9.59 9.90 1.58 35 100 9.67 9.83 1.60 35 100 
GDP per capita 9,243.03 
      9,243.03       0.00 35 100 29,285.60    29,875.09    3487.45 35 100 




Source: The authors. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of variables 
4.2. Univariate analysis and multicollinearity diagnostics  
Table 4 (panel A) reveals a number of significant correlations between the 
dependent variable (e-CTI) and the independent variables. This suggests that 
some of our hypotheses are credible. The e-CTI is significantly associated with 
ownership concentration, profitability (ROA) and debt, as well as with formal 
institutional factors such as the strength of the law (WGI), the GDP per capita and 
the level of inflation. We also recorded significant correlations between COB-
CEO duality and ownership concentration, ROA and formal institutional 
variables. However, ownership concentration, ROA and inflation are inversely 
related to the e-CTI. Analysis shows a strong correlation between three 
explanatory variables: GDP per capita, inflation and WGI. This could cause 
problems of multicollinearity in the model. As a consequence, it might be 
advisable to analyse the WGI and the economic variables (GDP per capita and 
inflation) separately. To evaluate the potential multicollinearity between the 
variables, we analysed the variables that explain the e-CTI, obtaining variance 
inflation factors (VIF), the values of which are below 2 and above the tolerance 
level of 0.60 (Xiao et al., 2004) (see Table 4, Panel B). 
 
 
Briano & Rodríguez                                         Corporate Information on the Internet by Listed Companies      21 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 e-CTI 1.000
2 COB-CEO 0.147 1.000
3 Board composition 0.104 0.052 1.000
4 Ownership concentration -0.262** -0.412** -0.328** 1.000
5 ROA -0.282* -0.287** 0.078 0.048 1.000
6 Leverage 0.257* 0.039 -0.080 -0.230 -0.078 1.000
7 GDP per capita 0.706** 0.262* -0.110 -0.098 -0.350** 0.192 1.000
8 Inflation -0.706** -0.262* 0.110 0.980 0.350** -0.192 -1.000** 1.000
9 WGI 0.722** 0.281* -0.117 -0.101 -0.368** 0.227 0.972** -0.972** 1.000
10 Size of the company (Ln) 0.105 0.022 -0.033 0.082 -0.040 0.097 0.029 -0.029 0.037 1.000
11 Size of the board (Ln) 0.104 0.066 -0.184 -0.054 -0.116 0.197 0.106 -0.106 0.117 0.231 1.000
*Correlation is significat at level of 0.05 (two sided)
**Correlation is significat at level of 0.01 (two sided)
Correlations and collineality diagnostics
Panel A: Pearson Correlation coefficients
 
Variable B VIF Tolerance B VIF Tolerance B VIF Tolerance
(Constant) 0.233 0.876 0.473
COB-CEO -0.185* 1.342 0.745 -0.164* 1.333 0.750 -0.164* 1.333 0.750
Board composition 0.106 1.276 0.783 0.107 1.277 0.783 0.107 1.277 0.783
Ownership concentration -0.249** 1.549 0.646 -0.235** 1.546 0.647 -0.235** 1.546 0.647
ROA -0.026 1.218 0.821 -0.045 1.205 0.830 -0.045 1.205 0.830
Leverage 0.034 1.205 0.830 0.069 1.183 0.845 0.069 1.183 0.845
WGI 0.733*** 1.274 0.785
GDP per capita 0.695*** 1.221 0.819
Inflation rate -0.695*** 1.221 0.819
Size of the company (Ln) 0.107 1.075 0.930 0.108 1.075 0.930 0.108 1.075 0.930
Size of the Board (Ln) 0.002 1.142 0.875 0.007 1.142 0.876 0.007 1.142 0.876
1. Variables are defined in table 3
2. Coefficients are based on 70 observations
3. Signif icant coefficients: p = .10 (*), p = .05 (**) y p = .01 (***).  They are marked in bold
4. Independent variable: e-CTI
5. VIF = Variance Inflation Variance
6. In the analysis w e have separated the variables GDP per capita, inflation rate and WGI
Panel B: Tolerance factors and variance inflation
 
 Source: The authors 
Table 4. Correlations 
 
4.3. Multivariate regression model 
Table 5 shows the results of the multivariate regression model used to test the 
hypotheses proposed in this paper. The model is derived from the aggregation of 
the three sub-indices of the e-CTI and the formal institutional variables (WGI, 
GDP per capita and inflation), the dimensions of corporate governance (COB-
CEO duality, board size, board independence and ownership concentration), and 
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the control variables (firm size, ROA and debt). The variables that are significant 
in the model (see Table 4 Panel B) are: WGI (p = 0.000), GDP per capita (p = 
0.000), inflation (which has a negative impact) (p = 0.000). The corporate 
governance variables that are significant in the model are ownership 
concentration, with a negative impact on the e-CTI (p = 0.005), and COB-CEO 
duality. These results are in line with those obtained by Vander Bauwhede and 
Willekens (2008), Barako et al. (2006) and Bonsón and Escobar (2004). 
In view of the above, the hypotheses accepted are H1 and H2. The first of these 
proposes that there is a positive relationship between the legal system, as 
measured by the application and strength of the legal system (WGI), and the 
corporate transparency level on the Internet (La Porta et al. 1998, 2004; Jaggi and 
Low, 2000). According to H2, the higher the level of economic development in a 
country, the more information will be disclosed by companies (Hope et al., 2008). 
Table 4 shows that the level of inflation is a significant variable in Model, with a 
negative sign, and so H3 is rejected. With respect to the corporate governance 
variables, H6 and H7 are accepted; these predict a negative relationship between 
ownership concentration and the level of corporate transparency in listed 
companies, and a negative relationship between COB-CEO duality and e-CTI 
(Chau and Gray, 2002; Ho and Wong, 2001; Hossain et al., 1994; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Barako et al., 2006; Vander Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; 
Gandía, 2008). 
H4 and H5, which predict a positive relationship between firm size and board 
composition and the e-CTI are rejected, while firm-level variables such as 
profitability (ROA), debt level and the size of the firm are not significant in the 
model. These results corroborate those found by Gandía (2008), Hope et al. 
(2008) and Oyelere et al. (2003). 
 
Table 5 
Multiple regression models 
Model R R square Corrected R  
square 
Change in R  
square Change in F 




a 0.784 0.614 0.560 0.614 11.351 0.000 2.105 
b 0.768 0.589 0.532 0.589 10.222 0.000 2.220 
c 0.768 0.589 0.532 0.589 10.222 0.000 2.220 
a. Explanatory variables: (Constant), LnBoard, Ownership concentration, ROE, LnSize, Leverage, WGI, Board composition, COB-CEO duality 
b. Explanatory variables: (Constant), LnBoard, Ownership concentration, ROE, LnSize, Leverage, GDP per capita, Board composit ion, COB-CEO duality 
c. Explanatory variables: (Constant), LnBoard, Ownership concentration, ROE, LnSize, Leverage, Inflation, Board composition, COB-CEO duality 
 
    Source: The authors 
Table 5. Multiple regression models 
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5. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The development of the Internet as a means to disseminate corporate information 
has created a new form of communication between companies and their 
stakeholders. An extensive body of literature has analysed the relationship 
between the level of corporate transparency on the Internet and dimensions of 
corporate governance, and business characteristics such as size, industry type and 
the country in which companies operate. To quantify the information disclosed on 
the web, various indices have been recommended, but those most often cited add 
information dichotomously, with no weighting criteria. Therefore, our first goal in 
this study was to compare the situations in Mexico and Spain by constructing an 
index of corporate transparency on the Internet (e-CTI) and compiling the 
information provided on the websites of major companies in Mexico (IPyC) and 
in Spain (IBEX 35). This e-CTI was based on previous research, and takes into 
account the regulatory framework in these countries. 
The second objective was to identify, under the institutional theory approach, 
the formal institutional factors (legal system and economic dimensions), corporate 
governance and corporate characteristics that could influence the e-CTI, using 
multiple regression analysis. The results obtained show that there are differences 
in corporate disclosure on the Internet between the two countries, with Spain 
obtaining a higher e-CTI than Mexico (80% and 59%, respectively). 
Furthermore, we identify the variables that influence the e-CTI, based on a 
population of 70 listed companies (35 in Mexico and 35 in Spain). Our results 
show that the e-CTI is strongly affected by formal institutional variables such as 
the legal system, GDP per capita and inflation. Governance variables that have a 
significant influence are ownership concentration and COB-CEO duality. 
However, other variables such as size of the board and board composition, 
leverage, profitability (ROA) and firm size are not significant in the model. In 
summary, these results suggest that factors that have been proposed in previous 
studies, and which have received empirical support as being determinant in the 
level of corporate transparency, play an important role in the context of these 
countries. 
Our work contributes to this subject in three main respects. First, by 
incorporating factors that have been recognised in comparative studies of other 
regions (both corporate and institutional variables). Second, by making use of the 
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institutional theory approach to deepen the scope of analysis. Finally, by focusing 
on Mexico and Spain, which have hitherto received little attention. 
There are several limitations to this study. First, there are problems inherent in 
any subjective rating and in evaluating the information contained in the annual 
reports of sample companies. Second, every element included in the e-CTI is 
assigned the same weight. Third, linear regression analysis does not overcome the 
problem of causality between variables. Moreover, the study population is limited 
to 70 large companies, while small and medium-sized enterprises are not 
considered. Finally, there is no longitudinal analysis which might have refined the 
conclusions drawn. 
However, despite the above limitations, the results are interesting and justify 
extending this research to a larger number of companies, and of course, to other 
emerging economies. Another interesting line for future research would be to 
include informal institutional variables such as national and corporate cultures and 
their influence on corporate transparency. The time period under analysis could 
also be extended, using panel data methodology. 
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